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Abstract:Wedescribe a framework for constructing an efficient non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) protocol
for n parties for any n ≥ 2. Our approach is based on the problem of computing isogenies between isogenous
elliptic curves, which is believed to be difficult. We do not obtain a working protocol because of a missing
step that is currently an open mathematical problem. What we need to complete our protocol is an efficient
algorithm that takes as input an abelian variety presented as a product of isogenous elliptic curves, and out-
puts an isomorphism invariant of the abelian variety.
Our framework builds a cryptographic invariant map, which is a new primitive closely related to a crypto-
graphic multilinear map, but whose range does not necessarily have a group structure. Nevertheless, we
show that a cryptographic invariant map can be used to build several cryptographic primitives, including
NIKE, that were previously constructed from multilinear maps and indistinguishability obfuscation.
Keywords:Multilinear maps, Non-Interactive Key Exchange, Isogenies
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1 Introduction
Let Fq be a finite field, let E be an ordinary elliptic curve over Fq, and let X be the set of isomorphism classes
of elliptic curves over Fq that are Fq-isogenous to E. The set X is almost always large (containing on the order
of
√q elements). Moreover, under suitable conditions on E, the set X is endowed with a free and transitive
action * by a certain abelian group G, which is the ideal class group of the endomorphism ring of E. The action
*maps a given g ∈ G and E ∈ X to a curve g * E ∈ X.
This action, originally defined by Deuring [16], has a number of properties thatmakes it useful in cryptog-
raphy. First, for a fixed curve E ∈ X, the map G → X defined by g ↦→ g *E is believed to be a one-way function.
In other words, given a random curve E′ ∈ X it is difficult to find an element g ∈ G such that E′ = g * E. This
suggests a Diffie–Hellman two-party key exchange protocol, proposed by Couveignes [14] and Rostovtsev and
Stolbunov [38]: Alice chooses a random a ∈ G and publishes Ea := a * E; Bob chooses a random b ∈ G and
publishes Eb := b * E. Their shared key is the curve Eab := (ab) * E = a * Eb = b * Ea , which they can both
compute. To ensure that both parties obtain the same key, their shared key is the j-invariant of the curve Eab.
More recently, De Feo, Jao, and Plût [20], Galbraith [24], Castryck et al. [11], and De Feo, Kieffer, and Smith [21]
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proposed variants of this protocol with better security and efficiency. Moreover, a supersingular version of
the isogeny problem was introduced and proposed as the basis for a collision resistant hash function [12].
Security of this one-way function was further studied in [19].
Second, as alluded to above, the star operator satisfies the following useful property: the abelian vari-
eties A
1
:= (g
1
* E) × · · · × (gn * E) and A2 := (g1 · · · gn) * E × En−1 are isomorphic for all g1, . . . , gn ∈ G (see
Appendix A.4 of [3]). As we will see in the next section, this suggests an n-party non-interactive key exchange
protocol, as well as many other cryptographic constructions. This property leads to a more general crypto-
graphic primitive that we call a cryptographic invariant map, defined in the next section. This primitive
has properties that are similar to those of cryptographic multilinear maps [6, 25], which have found numer-
ous applications in cryptography (e.g, [4, 7, 26, 27]). We discuss applications of cryptographic invariant maps
in Section 3. In Remark 4.4 we explain why we use ordinary and not supersingular elliptic curves. Section 4
describes our approach to constructing cryptographic invariant maps from isogenies. This work leads to the
following question in algebraic geometry.
An open problem. To make the cryptographic applications discussed above viable we must first over-
come an important technical challenge.While the varieties A
1
and A
2
defined above are isomorphic, they are
presented differently. Our applications require an efficientway to compute an invariant that is the same for A
1
and A
2
. In addition, the invariant must distinguish non-isomorphic varieties. We do not know any such com-
putable isomorphism invariant, and we present this as an open problem. In Section 5 we explain why some
natural proposals for isomorphism invariants do not seem to work. In Remarks 2.4 and 4.2 we show that a
solution to this open problem, even for n = 2, would solve the isogeny decision Diffie–Hellman problem. Fur-
ther, we give evidence that computing a particular isomorphism invariant might be equivalent to solving the
elliptic curve isogeny problem, which is believed (or hoped) to be a quantum-resistant hard problem. Thus,
Section 5 might be useful from the point of view of cryptanalysis of isogeny-based cryptography.
2 Cryptographic invariant maps
Definition 2.1. Let X be a finite set and let G be a finite abelian group. We say that G acts efficiently on X
freely and transitively if there is an efficiently computable map * : G × X → X such that:
– themap is a group action: g*(h*x) = (gh)*x, and there is an identity element id ∈ G such that id *x = x,
for all x ∈ X and all g, h ∈ G;
– the action is transitive: for every (x, y) ∈ X × X there is a g ∈ G such that g * x = y; and
– the action is free: if x ∈ X and g, h ∈ G satisfy g * x = h * x, then g = h.
Definition 2.2. By a cryptographic invariantmapwemean a randomized algorithmMapGen that inputs a
security parameter λ, outputs public parameters pp = (X, S, G, e), and runs in time polynomial in λ, where:
– X and S are sets, and X is finite,
– G is a finite abelian group that acts efficiently on X freely and transitively,
– e is a deterministic algorithm that runs in time polynomial in λ and n, such that for each n > 0, algo-
rithm e takes λ as input and computes a map en : Xn → S that satisfies:
– Invariance property of en: for all x ∈ X and g1, . . . , gn ∈ G,
en(g1 * x, . . . , gn * x) = en
(︀
(g
1
· · · gn) * x, x, . . . , x
)︀
;
– Non-degeneracy of en: for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
x
1
, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn ∈ X,
the map X → S defined by y ↦→ en(x1, . . . , xi−1, y, xi+1, . . . , xn) is injective.
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In our candidate instantiation for cryptographic invariant maps the set X is a set of isogenous elliptic curves
and the group G acting on X is a class group. The elements of S are isomorphism invariants of products of
elliptic curves.
Definition 2.2 is quite ambitious in that it asks that en be defined for all n > 0 and run in polynomial time
in n (and λ). A cryptographic invariant map that is defined even for a single n > 2, and satisfies the security
assumptions in the next subsection, would still be quite interesting. We require a construction that works
for all n because our framework using elliptic curve isogenies seems to support it. Similarly, we note that a
construction that works for all n > 0, but runs in time exponential in n is still useful. It would limit our ability
to evaluate en to relatively small n, but that is still of great interest. In the first three proposals in Section 5
we study candidates for en that run in time exponential in n, satisfy the non-degeneracy property, but do not
satisfy the invariance property. It is an open problem to find a map that also satisfies the invariance property.
Security assumptions. Next, we define some security assumptions on cryptographic invariant maps.
The notation x ←R X will denote an independent uniform random variable x over the set X. Similarly, we use
x′ ←R A(y) to define a random variable x′ that is the output of a randomized algorithm A on input y.
The n-way computational Diffie–Hellman assumption states that, given only the public parameters and
(g
1
* x, . . . , gn * x) ∈ Xn, it is difficult to compute en−1
(︀
(g
1
· · · gn) * x, x, . . . , x
)︀
. A precise definition is the
following:
Definition 2.3. We say that MapGen satisfies the n-way computational Diffie–Hellman assumption (n-
CDH) if for every polynomial time algorithmA,
Pr
[︁
A(pp, g
1
* x, . . . , gn * x) = en−1
(︀
(g
1
· · · gn) * x, x, . . . , x
)︀]︁
is a negligible function of λ, when pp←R MapGen(λ), g
1
, . . . , gn ←R G, and x ←R X.
Remark 2.4. The natural n-way decision Diffie–Hellman assumption on X does not holdwhen invariantmaps
exist. That is, for all n > 0 it is easy to distinguish (g
1
· · · gn) * x ∈ X from a random element of X, given only
x, g
1
* x, . . . , gn * x. Given a challenge y ∈ X, simply check if
en(y, x, . . . , x) = en(g1 * x, . . . , gn * x).
Equality holds if and only if y = (g
1
· · · gn) * x. However, in Definition 2.5 we define an n-way decision Diffie–
Hellmanassumption for en−1. It states that it is hard todistinguish en−1
(︀
(g
1
· · · gn)*x, x, . . . , x
)︀
froma random
element in the image of en−1, given only the public parameters, x, and (g1 * x, . . . , gn * x) ∈ Xn.
Definition 2.5. We say that MapGen satisfies the n-way decision Diffie–Hellman assumption (n-DDH) if
the following two distributions, P
0
and P
1
, are polynomially indistinguishable, when pp ←R MapGen(λ),
g
1
, . . . , gn ←R G, and x ←R X:
– P
0
is (pp, g
1
* x, . . . , gn * x, s0) where s0 = en−1
(︀
(g
1
· · · gn) * x, x, . . . , x
)︀
,
– P
1
is (pp, g
1
* x, . . . , gn * x, s1) where s1 is random in Im(en−1) ⊆ S.
3 Applications
We show that suitable cryptographic invariant maps can be used to solve a number of important problems in
cryptography.
n-way Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE). We show how to use a cryptographic invariant map to
construct a Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE) protocol in which n parties create a shared secret key that
only they can efficiently calculate, without any interaction among the n parties. Currently, secure n-party
NIKE for n > 3 is only known from general purpose indistinguishability obfuscation (e.g., [8]). Our NIKE
construction is similar to the one in [6, 25, 32] and satisfies a “static” notion of security.
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– Setup(λ): run (X, S, G, e)←R MapGen(λ) and choose x ←R X. Output pp := (X, S, G, e, x).
– For i = 1, . . . , n, party i chooses a random gi ←R G, computes xi := gi * x ∈ X, and publishes xi on a
public bulletin board.
– The shared key between the n-parties is
k := en−1
(︀
(g
1
· · · gn) * x, x, . . . , x
)︀
∈ S.
Party i ∈ {1, . . . , n} computes k by obtaining x
1
, . . . , xn from the bulletin board, then choosing some
j ∈ {1, . . . , n} where j = ̸ i, and computing
k = en−1(x1, . . . , xj−1, gi * xj , xj+1, . . . , xn) ∈ S,
where xi is omitted from the input to en−1.
All n parties obtain the same key k by the invariance property of en−1. Static security follows from the
n-way decision Diffie–Hellman assumption, as in [6]. Alternatively, we can rely on the weaker n-way compu-
tational Diffie–Hellman assumption by applying a hash function H : S → K to the key k. We model H as
a random oracle in the security analysis. We leave the question of an adaptively-secure NIKE, in the sense
of [22, 37], from an invariant map for future work.
Unique signatures and verifiable random functions (VRF). Adigital signature scheme ismade up of
three algorithms: a key generation algorithm that outputs a public key and a secret key, a signing algorithm
that signs a givenmessage using the secret key, and a verification algorithm that verifies a signature on a given
message using the public key. A signature scheme is a unique signature scheme if for every public key and
every message, there is at most one signature that will be accepted as a valid signature for that message
under the public key. While a number of unique signature schemes are known in the random oracle model
(e.g., [2, 5]), it is quite hard to construct unique signatures without random oracles [17, 35]. Unique signatures
are closely related to a simpler object called a verifiable random function, or VRF [36]. Previous results show
how to construct unique signatures and VRFs from multilinear maps without random oracles [6]. The same
constructions work with a cryptographic invariant map. The unique signature scheme works as follows: The
secret key is a random (g
1,0
, g
1,1
, . . . , gn,0, gn,1) ←R G2n. The public key is (x, y1,0, . . . , yn,1) ∈ X2n+1 where
x ←R X and yi,b := gi,b * x for i = 1, . . . , n and b = 0, 1. The signature on an n-bit message m ∈ {0, 1}n
is σ := (
∏︀n
i=1 gi,mi ) * x ∈ X. To verify a signature σ, check that en(σ, x, . . . , x) = en
(︀
y
1,m
1
, . . . , yn,mn
)︀
. The
security analysis of this construction is the same as in [6].
Constrained PRFs and broadcast encryption. We next describe how to construct constrained pseu-
dorandom functions [7, 9, 33] for bit-fixing constraints from a cryptographic invariant map. Such constrained
PRFs in turn can be used to build broadcast encryption with short ciphertexts [7].
A pseudorandom function (PRF) is a function F : K × A → B that is computable in polynomial time.
Here,K is the key space,A is the domain, and B is the codomain. Intuitively, PRF security requires that, for
a random key k ∈ K, an adversary who obtains pairs
(︀
a, F(k, a)
)︀
, for a ∈ A of its choice, cannot distinguish
these pairs from pairs
(︀
a, f (a)
)︀
where f is a random functionA→ B.
A bit-fixing constrained PRF is a PRF where a key k ∈ K can be constrained to only evaluate the PRF
on a subset of the domain A, where A = {0, 1}n. Specifically, for V ⊆ [n] = {1, . . . , n} and a function
v : V → {0, 1}, let Av = {a ∈ A : ∀i ∈ V , ai = v(i)}. A constrained key kv enables one to evaluate F(k, a)
for all a ∈ Av, but reveals nothing about F(k, a) for a ∈ ̸ Av. We refer to [7] for the complete definition of this
concept, and its many applications.
We now explain how to construct bit-fixing constrained PRFs from cryptographic invariant maps. The
construction and security proof are essentially the same as in Boneh and Waters [7], but translated to our
setting. One complication is that the construction of Boneh andWaters requires away to operate on invariants
in S. We get around this by delaying the evaluation of the invariant to the very last step. We thus obtain the
following bit-fixing constrained PRF:
Multiparty NIKE and More From Isogenies | 9
– Setup(λ): run (X, S, G, e)←R MapGen(λ) and choose x ←R X.
Next choose α ←R G and di,b ←R G for i ∈ [n] and b ∈ {0, 1}.
Output the key k = (X, S, G, e, α, {di,b}i,b).
– The PRF is defined as: F(k, a) = en
(︀
(α ×
∏︀n
i=1 di,ai ) * x, x, . . . , x
)︀
.
Here, a ∈ {0, 1}n specifies a subset product of the set of di,b’s.
– Constrain(k, v): Let V ⊆ [n] be the support of the function v, and assume V is not empty. The con-
strained key kv is constructed as follows. Set Di,b = di,b * x for i ∈ ̸ V. Let i0 be the smallest element of
V. Choose |V| − 1 random gi ∈ G for i ∈ V \ {i0}, and set gi
0
= α ×
∏︀
i∈V di,vi × (
∏︀
i∈V\{i
0
} gi)
−1 ∈ G. Let
hi = gi * x for i ∈ V.
The constrained key is kv =
(︀
{Di,b}i∉V ,b∈{0,1}, {hi}i∈V
)︀
.
– Eval(kv , a): To evaluate F(k, a) using the constrained key kv do the following. If a ∈ ̸ Av, output ◇.
Otherwise, for i = 1, . . . , n, let Ci = Di,ai if i ∉ V, and let Ci = hi otherwise. Output en(C1, . . . , Cn).
Then, by construction,
en(C1, . . . , Cn) = en
⎛⎝⎛⎝∏︁
i∈ ̸V
di,ai
∏︁
i∈V
gi
⎞⎠
* x, x, . . . , x
⎞⎠
= F(k, a).
The security proof is as in [7]. This construction can be further extended to a verifiable random function
(VRF) by adapting Fuchsbauer [23] similarly.
Witness encryption. Witness encryption, due toGarg et al. [27], canbeused to construct Identity-Based
Encryption, Attribute-Based Encryption, broadcast encryption [42], and secret sharing forNP statements.Wit-
ness encryption is a form of encryption where a public key is simply an NP statement, and a secret key is a
witness for that statement. More precisely, a witness encryption scheme is a pair of algorithms:
– Enc(x,m) is a randomized polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input an NP statement x and a mes-
sage m, and outputs a ciphertext c;
– Dec(x, w, c) is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a statement x, supposed
witness w, and ciphertext c, and attempts to produce the message m.
We require that if w is a valid witness for x, then for any message m, if c ←R Enc(x,m), then Dec(x, w, c)
outputs m with probability 1.
The basic notion of security for witness encryption is soundness security, which requires that if x is false,
then Enc(x,m)hides all information aboutm. A stronger notion called extractable security, due toGoldwasser
et al. [28], requires, informally, that if one can learn any information aboutm from Enc(x,m), then it must be
the case that one “knows” a witness for x.
We briefly describe how to construct witness encryption from invariant maps. It suffices to give a con-
struction from any NP-complete problem. There are at least two natural constructions frommultilinear maps
that we can use. One approach is to adapt the original witness encryption scheme of Garg et al. [27] based on
the Exact Cover problem. This approach unfortunately also requires the same graded structure as needed by
Boneh and Waters [7]. However, we can apply the same ideas as in our constrained PRF construction to get
their scheme to work with invariant maps. Another is the scheme of Zhandry [42] based on Subset Sum.¹
As with the constructions of Garg et al. and Zhandry, the security of these constructions can be justified
in an idealized attack model for the cryptographic invariant map, allowing only the operations explicitly
allowed by themap—namely the group action and themap operation. Justification in idealizedmodels is not
a proof, but provides heuristic evidence for security.
1 The basic scheme shown by Zhandry requires an “asymmetric” multilinear map, where the inputs to the map come from different
sets. However, Zhandry also explains how to instantiate the scheme using symmetric multilinear maps. The symmetric scheme
easily translates to use invariant maps.
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4 Cryptographic invariant maps from isogenies
We begin by recalling some facts that are presented in more detail in Appendix A of [3]. Let E be an ordinary
elliptic curve over a finite field Fq such that the ring Z[π] generated by its Frobenius endomorphism π is
integrally closed. This implies in particular that Z[π] is the full endomorphism ring O of E. Let Cl(O) denote
the ideal class group of this ring, and let Ell(O) denote the isogeny class of E; that is, isomorphism classes
of elliptic curves over Fq which are Fq-isogenous to E. There exists a free and transitive action * of Cl(O) on
Ell(O), and there is a way to represent elements of Cl(O) (namely, as products of prime ideals of small norm)
thatmakes this action efficiently computable. Moreover, one can efficiently sample close to uniform elements
in Cl(O) under that representation. In addition, the “star operator” * satisfies the following property: for any
choice of ideal classes a
1
, . . . , an , a′
1
, . . . , a′n in Cl(O), the abelian varieties
(a
1
* E) × · · · × (an * E) and (a′1 * E) × · · · × (a′n * E) (1)
are isomorphic over Fq if and only if a1 · · · an = a′1 · · · a′n in Cl(O). In particular:
(a
1
* E) × · · · × (an * E) ∼= (a1 · · · an) * E × En−1. (2)
Denote by Ab(E) the set of abelian varieties over Fq that are a product of the form (2), and assume that
we can efficiently compute an isomorphism invariant for abelian varieties in Ab(E). In other words, assume
that we have an efficiently computable map isom: Ab(E) → S to some set S that to any tuple E
1
, . . . , En of
elliptic curves isogenous to E associates an element isom(E
1
× · · · × En) of S such that isom(E1 × · · · × En) =
isom(E′
1
× · · · × E′n) if and only if the products E1 × · · · × En and E′1 × · · · × E′n are isomorphic as abelian varieties.
The curves Ei are given for example by their j-invariants, and in particular, the ideal classes ai such that
Ei ∼= ai * E are not supposed to be known.
Based on such an isomorphism invariant isom, we construct a cryptographic invariant map as follows.
The algorithmMapGen(λ) computes a sufficiently large base fieldFq, and an elliptic curve E overFq such that
the ring Z[π] generated by its Frobenius endomorphism is integrally closed (this can be done efficiently: see
again Appendix A of [3]). The algorithm then outputs the public parameters pp = (X, S, G, e) where:
– X = Ell(O) is the isogeny class of E over Fq;
– S is the codomain of the isomorphism invariant isom;
– G = Cl(O) is the ideal class group of O; and
– the map en : Xn → S is given by en(E1, . . . , En) = isom(E1 × · · · × En).
The facts recalled at the beginning of this section show that G acts efficiently on X freely and transitively
in the sense of Definition 2.1, and that the properties of Definition 2.2 are satisfied. In particular, the invariance
property follows from (2), and thenon-degeneracy from the fact that the abelian varieties in (1) are isomorphic
only if the correspondingproducts of ideal classes coincide. Thus, this approachdoes provide a cryptographic
invariant map assuming isom exists.
Remark 4.1. In the 2-party case, the NIKE protocol obtained from this construction coincideswith the isogeny
key exchange protocols over ordinary curves described by Couveignes [14] and Rostovtsev–Stolbunov [38].
Remark 4.2. The existence of isom breaks the isogeny decision Diffie–Hellman problem. Indeed, given three
elliptic curves (a * E, b * E, c * E) isogenous to E, one can check whether c = ab in Cl(O) by testing whether
the surfaces (c * E) × E and (a * E) × (b * E) are isomorphic. This does not prevent the construction of secure
NIKE protocols (as those can be based on the computational isogeny Diffie–Hellman problem by applying a
hash function: see Section 3), but currently, no efficient algorithm is known for this isogeny decision Diffie–
Hellman problem.
Remark 4.3. For certain applications, it would be interesting to be able to hash to the set X = Ell(O), i.e.,
construct a random-looking curve E′ in the isogeny class of E without knowing an isogeny walk from E to E′.
An equivalent problem is to construct a random-looking elliptic curvewith exactly #E(Fq)points overFq. This
seems difficult, however; the normal way of doing so involves the CMmethod, which is not efficient when the
discriminant is large.
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Remark 4.4. One can ask whether this construction extends to the supersingular case. Over Fp2 with p prime,
the answer is clearly no, as the isogeny class of a supersingular elliptic curve is not endowed with a natural
free and transitive group action by an abelian group. More importantly, isomorphism classes of products of
isogenous supersingular elliptic curves over Fq are essentially trivial at least in a geometric sense. Indeed,
according to a result of Deligne (see [39, Theorem 3.5]), if E
1
, . . . , En , E′
1
, . . . , E′n are all isogenous to a super-
singular elliptic curve E, then E
1
× · · · × En ∼= E′
1
× · · · × E′n over Fq as soon as n ≥ 2. In fact, the result holds
over any extension of the base field over which all the endomorphisms of E are defined, so already over Fp2 .
However, for a supersingular elliptic curve E over a prime field Fp, the number of Fp-isomorphism classes
of products E
1
× · · · × En with all Ei isogenous to E can be large. For example, this is shown when n = 2 in
[41, Section 5]. Therefore, one could conceivably obtain a “commutative supersingular” version of the con-
struction above, which would generalize the recent 2-party key exchange protocol CSIDH [11], assuming that
Fp-isomorphism invariants can be computed in that setting. Since those invariants must be arithmetic rather
than geometric in nature, however, this seems even more difficult to achieve than in the ordinary case.
5 Some natural candidate cryptographic invariant maps
In order to instantiate a cryptosystem based on the ideas in this paper, it remains to find an efficiently com-
putable map isom: Ab(E)→ S for some set S, as in the previous section. Belowwe give evidence that several
natural candidates fail, either because efficiently computing themwould break the cryptographic security, or
because they are not in fact isomorphism invariants.
Our primary roadblock is thatwhile E
1
×· · ·×En and E′
1
×· · ·×E′n can be isomorphic as unpolarized abelian
varieties, they are not necessarily isomorphic as polarized abelian varieties with their product polarizations.
The first three proposals below for invariants are invariants of the isomorphism class as polarized abelian
varieties, but are not invariants of the isomorphism class as unpolarized abelian varieties. We do not know a
way for the different parties to choose polarizations on their product varieties in a compatible way, to produce
the same invariant, without solving the elliptic curve isogeny problem.
At present, we do not know an invariant of abelian varieties in dimension ≥ 2 that does not require choos-
ing a polarization, with the exception of what we call the “Deligne invariant”, described below.
The theta null invariant. One natural candidate is given by Mumford’s theta nulls, presented in detail
in Appendix B of [3]. Unfortunately, in order to compute even a single theta null, one must first choose a
principal polarization, and the resulting invariant does depend on this choice of polarization in a crucial
way. In [3, Proposition B.7] we show that, as a result, the theta nulls do not in fact provide an isomorphism
invariant as unpolarized abelian varieties.
Igusa invariants. Suppose n = 2 and End E ⊗ Q ∼= Q(
√
−d) with d ∈ N square-free. If d = ̸ 1, 3, 7, 15,
then for E
1
and E
2
in the isogeny class of E, the product E
1
×E
2
is the Jacobian of a genus2 curve C (see [30]). It
is possible to compute such a genus2 curve C, given a suitable principal polarization on E
1
×E
2
. For each such
C, one could then compute the Igusa invariants [31] of C. The number of genus 2 curves C such that E
1
× E
2
is isomorphic to the Jacobian variety of C is large ([29] and [34, Theorem 5.1]), and unfortunately the Igusa
invariants are different for different choices of C. There are many principal polarizations on each element of
Ab(E), and no compatible way for the different parties to choose the same one.
Invariants of Kummer surfaces. When n = 2, another approach is to consider the Kummer surface
of A = E
1
× E
2
, which is the quotient K = A/{±1}. The surface K itself does not depend on a polarization.
But extracting an invariant from K, for example as in [10, Chapter 3], does depend on having a projective
embedding of K.
Deligne invariant. A natural candidate is an isomorphism invariant studied by Deligne [15]. Suppose
A is an ordinary abelian variety over k = Fq. The Serre-Tate canonical lift of A to characteristic 0 produces an
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abelian variety over the ring of Witt vectorsW(¯k). Fixing an embedding α ofW(¯k) intoC, we can view this lift
as a complex abelian variety A(α). Let Tα(A) denote the first integral homology group of A(α). The Frobenius
endomorphism F of A also lifts to characteristic 0 and defines an action of F on Tα(A). The theorem in [15, §7]
shows that ordinary abelian varieties A and B over Fq are isomorphic if and only if there is an isomorphism
Tα(A)→ Tα(B) that respects the action of F.
A natural candidate for a cryptographic invariant map is the map that sends (E
1
, . . . , En) to the isomor-
phism invariant
Tα(E1 × · · · × En) = Tα(E1)⊕ · · ·⊕ Tα(En).
Specifying the isomorphism class of Tα(E1 × · · · × En) as a Z[F]-module is equivalent to specifying the action
of F as a 2n × 2n integer matrix, unique up to conjugacy over Z. However, we show in Theorem 5.1 below
that being able to compute Tα(E) for an elliptic curve E in polynomial time would yield a polynomial-time
algorithm to solve the elliptic curve isogeny problem of recovering a given E and a * E, and conversely.
Theorem 5.1. An efficient algorithm to computeDeligne invariants Tα(E) on an isogeny class of ordinary elliptic
curves over a finite field k gives an efficient algorithm to solve the elliptic curve isogeny problem in that isogeny
class. Conversely, an efficient algorithm to solve the elliptic curve isogeny problemonan isogeny class of ordinary
elliptic curves over k yields an efficient algorithm to compute, for some embedding α : W(¯k) →˓ C, the Deligne
invariants Tα(E) on the isogeny class.
Proof. Suppose that E
1
and E
2
are in the isogeny class, and suppose that for i = 1, 2wehave aZ-basis {ui , vi}
for Tα(Ei) and a 2×2 integermatrix giving the action of Fwith respect to this basis.Wewill efficiently compute
a fractional ideal a such that a * E
1
∼
= E
2
.
Let f (t) be the characteristic polynomial of Frobenius acting on E
1
or E
2
; these are the same since E
1
and
E
2
are isogenous. Let R = Z[t]/(f ) and RQ = R ⊗Z Q. Then Tα(Ei) is a rank one R-module, with t acting as F.
Compute ai , bi ∈ Z such that F(ui) = aiui +bivi. Let ai be the fractional R-ideal generated by 1 and (t−ai)/bi.
Compute and output a = a
1
a−1
2
.
We claim that a * E
1
∼
= E
2
. Define λi : Tα(Ei) →˓ RQ by sending w ∈ Tα(Ei) to the unique λi(w) ∈ RQ such
that λi(w) · ui = w. Then λi(ui) = 1 and λi(vi) = (t − ai)/bi, so the fractional ideal ai is the image of the map λi.
SupposeM is a positive integer such thatMa is an integral ideal of R, and let h = λ−1
2
∘Mλ
1
. Then h(Tα(E1)) is
an R-submodule of Tα(E2). By [15, §7], the map E ↦→ Tα(E) is a fully faithful functor, i.e., it induces a bijection
Homk(E1, E2)→ HomR(Tα(E1), Tα(E2)).
Thus h arises from a unique isogeny ϕ : E
1
→ E
2
. By [15, §4], the kernel of ϕ is isomorphic as an R-module
to Tα(E2)/h(Tα(E1)). The latter R-module is isomorphic to R/Ma, and hence is exactly annihilated by Ma.
Thus ker(ϕ) ∼= E
1
[Ma], so E
2
∼
= E
1
/E
1
[Ma] ∼= (Ma) * E
1
. Since Ma and a are in the same ideal class, we have
E
2
∼
= a*E
1
, as desired. Fractional ideals can be inverted in polynomial time by [1, Algorithm 5.3] or [13, §4.8.4]
(see [1, p. 21] for the complexity).
Conversely, suppose we have an algorithm that efficiently solves the isogeny problem in the isogeny class
of anordinary elliptic curve E
0
. TakeR as above.We showbelow that there exists an embedding α : W(¯k) →˓ C
such that Tα(E0) ∼= R. Given E isogenous to E0, use the isogeny problem algorithm to compute a such that
E
0
∼
= a * E. Output Tα(E) = a.
It remains to show that an embedding α : W(¯k) →˓ C exists such that Tα(E0) ∼= R and Tα(E) = a.We follow
an argument in the proof of [18, Theorem 2.1]. There exists an elliptic curve E′ overCwith CM by R for which
H
1
(E′,Z) ∼= R as R-modules. Take any embedding β : W(¯k) →˓ C. Then the complex elliptic curve E(β)
0
has CM
by R, and by the theory of complex multiplication there exists σ ∈ Gal(C/Q) such that E′ = σ(E(β)
0
) = E(σ∘β)
0
.
Let α = σ ∘ β. By construction, Tα(E0) = H1(E′,Z) ∼= R. Further, by [40, Prop. II.1.2], Tα(E) ∼= a⊗R Tα(E0) ∼= a,
as claimed.
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